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Abstract 
I derive poverty indices taking into account both the absolute and relative aspects of income well-being. 
The trade-off made by the social planner between those two aspects is captured at individual level by a 
well-being ordering. This ordering evaluates the well-being of an agent based on her income and a 
reference statistic on the income distribution, typically the mean. A family of poverty indices respecting 
the judgements held in the ordering is axiomatically characterized. Then, I study the consequences of 
requiring the poverty indices to grant a minimal precedence to the absolute over the relative aspect of 
income well-being. This compelling requirement has strong implications. In particular, the Poverty Gap 
Ratio is the only index in the popular Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family to satisfy it. 
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1 Introduction
In the last 15 years, several international institutions have identified the reduc-
tion of poverty as one of their major objectives. The United Nations set poverty
reduction as one of its eight Millenium Developement Goals and the European
Commission identified it as one of its five main headline targets for its EU 2020
strategy. Making policy recommendations or simply monitoring the progress
in global poverty reduction requires an unambiguous definition of poverty. My
objective is therefore to derive income poverty measures from a global perspec-
tive. Since the groundbreaking contribution of Sen (1976), the construction of
an income poverty measure follows a three steps procedure. First, the space
in which poverty is measured must be chosen. Then, a threshold allowing to
identify the poor is selected. Finally, the poverty of all individuals in a popu-
lation is aggregated into an overall poverty measure. Following Atkinson and
Bourguignon (2001), I limit here the space of poverty to the inadequacy of com-
mand over economic resources. The command a person has over resources is
measured by her income or the value of her consumption. This interpretation of
poverty is obviously narrow as it does not account for deprivations in important
dimensions such as health, education or safety. Income poverty is nevertheless
an important aspect of poverty as income allows buying goods and services nec-
essary for leading a decent life. In the identification step, a poverty line must
be chosen. This line defines the income threshold below which an individual is
considered to be poor. As noted by Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001), taking
a world perspective raises the challenge of developing a globally inclusive mea-
sure, giving equal treatment to all citizens of the world. The difficulty is that
different countries use different kinds of poverty lines (see Datt et al. (1991) or
more recently Ravallion (2012)). Most developing countries use absolute poverty
lines. These lines are usually anchored to the satisfaction of a minimal level of
nutrition and their corresponding income threshold only evolve with inflation.
On the other hand, many developed countries use relative poverty lines, for
which the corresponding income threshold evolves as a constant fraction of a
statistic on the income distribution, typically the mean or the median. National
poverty measures using different poverty lines can hence not be compared from
a global perspective, as individuals in different countries would not be treated
equally. Furthermore, if a global measure is to be relevant for all countries in
the world, it must combine both the absolute and relative aspects of income
poverty.
In the literature, there are two main proposals for combining both absolute
and relative aspects of income poverty. The first road, opened by Atkinson
and Bourguignon (2001), consists in using two poverty lines, one absolute and
one relative. Poor individuals can be considered as absolutely poor, relatively
poor or both, depending on the position of their income with respect to both
lines. They explored two ways of combining absolute and relative povery. First,
the social planner could consider there exists a hierarchy that ranks absolute
poverty above relative poverty. There would hence be two measures of poverty
to be considered in lexicographic order. Second, the social planner could con-
struct the poverty measure as the result of a multidimensional exercise. The
income shortfalls with respect to each poverty line are then aggregated to ob-
tain the global poverty measure. Their proposal is based on several parameters
which together control for the precedence given to absolute poverty, the ex-
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tent of double-counting and poverty aversion.1 This second approach has the
merit of yielding a single measure taking both absolute and relative aspects into
account. Nevertheless, the properties of their proposed measure are unclear
as they do not provide an axiomatic characterization for it. Furthermore, the
exact values of the three parameters are left unspecified, which makes its appli-
cation challenging. The second road, opened by Foster (1998) and followed by
Ravallion and Chen (2011) and Ravallion (2012), consists in defining an hybrid
poverty lines taking into account both absolute and relative aspects. Hybrid
lines have their income threshold evolve with mean income, but not necessarly
as a constant fraction. Their income elasticity with respect to mean income
is typically between 0 and 1, respectively the elasticity of absolute and purely
relative lines. The poverty measure for a country taking a global perspective
is then taken to be the fraction of individuals in that country whose income
falls below the hybrid line. The poverty measure is hence obtained by using
an aggregated index called the Head-Count Ratio. With absolute poverty line,
Foster and Shorrocks (1991) have characterized the family to which this index
belongs and therefore the properties it satisfies are well-known. Nevertheless,
with relative or hybrid poverty lines, no such characterization exists. There is
hence no solid foundations for using the Head-Count Ratio. As a result, global
poverty measures based on this index might behave in counter-intuitive ways.
Avoiding bad behavior requires then to derive axiomatically a suitable index.
My proposal for solving these issues is to introduce, at the identification step,
an income well-being ordering. This ordering is a social preference balancing,
at the individual level, the absolute and relative aspects of income well-being.
For simplicity, relative income is assumed to be the fraction of own income over
society’s standard of living. Following Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) and
Ravallion (2012), mean income is the reference statistic capturing standard of
living. The income well-being of an agent will therefore depend on both her own
income and the mean of the income vector. The hybrid poverty line is selected
to be one of the indifference curves of this ordering. As a result, this line cor-
responds to the minimal level of income well-being below which an individual
is poor. Implicitly, the single measure proposed by Atkinson and Bourguignon
(2001) defines such an ordering. My proposal is to define this ordering explicitely
before aggregating the income shortfalls.
At the aggregation step, income poverty indices are required to respect the
judgements held in the well-being ordering. The endogeneous link existing be-
tween mean income and the income threshold is then automatically respected
by the indices. On this basis, an extension of the family of additive poverty
indices of Foster and Shorrocks (1991) is characterized. The indices obtained
are thus in essence the average lack of income well-being in the population.
Then, the indices are required to give a minimal precedence to absolute over
relative aspects of income poverty. This precedence is a normative view not only
shared by scholars (such as Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001)) but it emerged
from a questionnaire survey conducted in different countries around the globe by
Corazzini et al. (2011). This compelling requirement strongly constrains the nu-
merical representations of the well-being ordering defining the additive poverty
indices. In particular, among the numerical representations belonging to the
1Double counting arises when an agent’s income is below the two poverty lines. The
distance between her income and the minimal of these two lines enters in both gaps.
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Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family defined in Foster et al. (1984), only the
Poverty Gap Ratio satisfies it. The interest of this last result comes from the
wide use of the FGT family in empirical applications. Those results are then
extended to the use of other reference statistics than the mean for capturing
standard of living.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the foundations in the
capability approach of the indices derived. Notations and well-being orderings
are introduced in section 3. The poverty axioms and their implications are pre-
sented in section 4. Finally, the extension to a class of reference statistics is
studied in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Capability underpinning
This section discusses how the global poverty indices derived here belong to
the capability approach developed in Sen (1985). This book summarizes the
important point made by Sen according to which economic (dis)advantages of
individuals should not be measured in the space of income or utilities but in the
space of capabilities and functionings. Functionings are all the doings and the
beings that matter to individuals. Simple examples of functionings are being
healthy, being able to move to places one needs to go to, being able to com-
municate with others, etc. The functioning vector achieved by an individual do
not only depend on her external resources such as income but on her personal
characteristics as well. For example, an handicaped individual might need more
resources for traveling from one point to another than a non-handicaped individ-
ual. Capabilities are the set of functionings vectors an indidividual can achieve.
Capabilities capture hence the individual freedom, the size of the choice set of
an individual given her characteristics and the resources she commands.
Following Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001), a global income poverty measure
must consider two crucial functionings, physical survival and social participa-
tion. Both functionings are achieved by consuming goods and services measured
here in a unique space: income. The cost of goods and services associated with
physical survival, like food, is assumed not to evolve with the income distribu-
tion. On the other hand, participating in the social life of a particular society
requires a bundle of goods and services that depends on the standard of living in
that society. The higher the standard, the more expensive this bundle will be.
For example, in Adam Smith’s England, wearing a linen shirt was a pre-requisite
for social participation. As shown by Atkinson (1995), not only the composition
of this bundle but also the real cost of some of its goods and services evolves
with standard of living. Therefore, the level of social participation an individual
can achieve given a particular income depends on her “personal”characteristic:
the standard of living in her society. For simplicity, all other individual charac-
teristics are omitted.
Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) associate one poverty line to each functioning:
the absolute line is associated physical survival and the relative line to social
participation. My proposal, based on an income well-being ordering, considers
a unique poverty line. This poverty line coincide with one of the indifference
curves of the ordering. Each indifference curve can be constructed such that all
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its points are associated with the same vector of functionings.2 Therefore, an
agent is identified to be poor if her income is not sufficient to buy a bundle of
goods and services allowing her to reach the minimal level of both functionings
together. Such a bundle would not only contain goods and services necessary for
physical survival but also some required for social participation. As the cost of
social participation increases with mean income, so must the indifference curves
and hence the poverty line. Notice that the total cost of reaching the minimal
levels in each functioning together need not be the sum of reaching each sepa-
rately, as some goods may serve both ends. This is for example the case of a
linen shirt which serves both clothing and social participation purposes.
A given income in a particular society defines an individual’s capability, i.e. the
set of functioning vectors she can achieve. This set is defined by the functioning
vectors attached, in her society, to the different bundles of goods and services
she can afford with her income. Different points of one indifference curve are
attached different capabilities. Points with low mean have vectors with higher
levels of social participation and lower physical survival in their capability set
than points with high mean. Nevertheless, being on the same indifference curve,
all of them are judged equally valuable by the ordering. As a result, the income
well-being ordering defines an ordering in the space of capabilities.
3 The model
3.1 Basic notations
Let y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn) be an income vector composed of non-negative incomes.
Its elements are sorted in non-decreasing order (y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yn). The
population size corresponding to y is n(y). Mean income in y is written y =
∑
yi
n
.
I refer to yi as the absolute income of agent i and
yi
y
as her relative income. The
results derived with the mean are extended to a class of reference statistics in
section 5.
The social planner evaluates individual well-being based on an ethical preference
 balancing their absolute and relative income. This ethical preference ∈ R
is a continuous ordering over the set of bundles X = {(yi, y) ∈ R+ × R++}.
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See Figure 1 for examples of such well-being orderings. Let (yi, y)  (y
′
i, y
′)
denote the judgment that an agent receiving income yi when mean income is y
has a weakly higher well-being than an agent receiving y′i when mean income
is y′. The symmetric and asymmetric parts of  are represented by ∼ and ≻
respectively.
The identification of poverty is based on . Agent i is considered as poor if and
only if her bundle is deemed strictly worse than a reference bundle (z1, z2) ∈ X .
Let Xp = {(yi, y) ∈ X |(z1, z2) ≻ (yi, y)} be the subset of bundles yielding
a lower well-being than the well-being threshold associated to the reference
bundle. Agent i is poor if and only if (yi, y) ∈ Xp. Let z : R++ → R++ be
the threshold function yielding at y the income threshold corresponding to the
well-being threshold. The income threshold z(y) solves (z1, z2) ∼
(
z(y), y
)
, as
illustrated in Figure 1.a. Agent i is then poor if and only if z(y) > yi. The
2The set of these vectors characterizing the indifference curves form an increasing path in
the space of functioning.
3An ordering is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation.
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number of poor agents in y is noted q(y).
The objective is to rank income distributions according to the level of poverty
they contain. A small limitation of the results derived is that they only hold
when ranking income distributions for which at least one agent is non-poor. The
set of income distribution is hence Y = {y ∈ Rn+ with n ∈ N|yn ≥ z(y)}. Given
 and (z1, z2), a poverty index is a function P : Y → R such that P (y) > P (y
′)
means there is strictly more poverty in y than in y′. I now turn to the definition
of the domain R of well-being orderings.
3.2 Domain of well-being orderings
The ethical preference over bundles of the social planner is a continuous ordering
belonging to the domainR. The domainR is limited by four restrictions. Those
minimal restrictions exclude exotic trade-offs between absolute and relative in-
come. First, R1 assumes that relative income is not a bad for the well-being of
the poor. Then, restrictions R2 to R4 limit the importance of relative income
for individual well-being. In essence, restriction R2 requires that, if the income
vector y′ is obtained from y by distributing equally an extra amount of income,
all poor agents are weakly better-off. Restriction R3 states that however large
the relative income of an agent may be, there always exists an absolute income
that, if earned by all agents, strictly increases that agent’s well-being. It is as-if
agents were always ready to give up their good relative income provided their
absolute income is sufficiently increased.4 Restriction R4 requires there always
be a limit to the portion of an agent’s absolute income that, if traded against
lower mean income, improves her well-being. An agent with zero income is
therefore strictly worse-off than another agent with non-zero income.
• R1 (Relative income is not a bad):
For all (yi, y), (y
′
i, y
′) ∈ Xp, if yi = y
′
i and y < y
′, then (yi, y)  (y
′
i, y
′).
• R2 (Translation Monotonicity):
For all (yi, y) ∈ Xp, a > 0, we have (yi + a, y + a)  (yi, y).
• R3 (Well-off’s limited relative concern):
For all (yi, y) ∈ X with yi > y there exists a > yi such that (a, a) ≻ (yi, y).
• R4 (Minimum absolute concern):
For all yi > 0, y, y
′ ∈ R++, we have (yi, y) ≻ (0, y
′).
Graphically, the slopes of the indifference curves below the poverty line must
be non-negative (R1) but weakly smaller than one (R2). Indifference curves
passing through bundles above the bissectrice must cross the bissectrice (R3).
Finally, there is a flat indifference curve for yi = 0, on the horizontal axis (R
4).
The domain R defined by R1 to R4 is very rich, as illustrated by the examples
in Figure 1.
Two remarks must be made about orderings in R. First, if the parameter s¯
of the family illustrated in 1.b is set to zero, the threshold function is an abso-
lute poverty line. If instead, the parameter z0 of that family is set to zero, the
threshold function is a constant fraction of the mean. This corresponds then
4This interpretation is abusive since  is the ethical preference of the social planner rather
than the agent’s preferences.
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Figure 1: (a) Indifference curves of an ordering in the bundle space X , with a
distribution (y1, y2, y3) ∈ Y . The reference bundle (z1, z2) identifies the indiffer-
ence curve from which the threshold function z is derived. (b) Family of linear
orderings parametrized by intercept z0 and slope s¯ of the threshold function,
with z0 ≥ 0 and s¯ ∈ [0, 1). (c) Family of piecewise linear orderings with flat
threshold function for y ≤ y∗ and z = s¯y for y > y∗, with s¯ ∈ [0, 1).
to a relative poverty line. This does not conflict with R4, since the set X is
defined for y > 0. This framework can hence deal with both kinds of poverty
lines. Nevertheless, this approach does not aim at separating purely absolute
and purely relative income poverty. Rather, it aims at developing one notion
of income poverty considering both absolute and relative income. Second, the
poverty indices developed for absolute poverty lines in the literature surveyed
in Zheng (1997) can be divided between those respecting Translation invariance
and those respecting Scale invariance. Those axioms constrain the comparison
of distributions facing different income thresholds.5 Although very convenient,
there exists no convincing defense for these axioms, as noted in Zheng (1997).
Using an income well-being ordering makes transparent how the individual well-
being evolves when mean income and therefore the income threshold is changed.
As a consequence, there is no need to resort to these axioms.
Two extra restrictions, R5 and R6, do not enter the definition of our basic do-
main R, but will be referred to when they help simplify the exposition. Restric-
tion R5 does not impose any additional constrain on the shape of the threshold
function z. Rather, once z is chosen, all the lower indifference curves are fixed:
they evolve as constant fractions of z. Restriction R6 is an extreme way of
looking at relative income. It requires relative income to be irrelevant for the
well-being of poor agents.
• R5 (Fraction of threshold function):
For all (yi, y), (y
′
i, y
′) ∈ Xp, if
yi
z(y) =
y′i
z(y′) , then (yi, y) ∼ (y
′
i, y
′).
• R6 (Flat indifference curves):
For all (yi, y¯), (y
′
i, y
′) ∈ Xp, if yi = y
′
i, then (yi, y¯) ∼ (y
′
i, y
′).
The selection of suitable deprivation ordering  ∈ R and reference bundle
(z1, z2) concludes the identification step. In the next section, I present the
axioms defining the properties that the poverty indices should satisfy.
5Abusing slightly notations to let z become an argument of P , Translation invariance
requires that P (y+ a1n, z+ a) = P (y, z) and Scale invariance that P (ay, az) = P (y, z). The
symbol 1n refers to a n-dimensional vector of ones.
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4 Axiomatic characterization
4.1 Additive poverty indices
This section aims at characterizing a family of income poverty indices. Many
autors such as Kakwani (1980) or Chakravarty (1983) have characterized such
families for absolute poverty lines. In my framework, the families derived for
absolute poverty line correspond to a case where the underlying ordering satisfies
the additional restriction R6. What follows is then the first characterization
valid for any ordering in R. Otherly stated, the first characterization of poverty
indices for distribution-dependent poverty lines. Calling them relative poverty
indices would nevertheless be reducive as both absolute and relative income are
taken into account.
I present here six poverty axioms. Five of them are required in order to derive a
generalization of the family characterized by Foster and Shorrocks (1991). The
first axiom makes sure that poverty is only concerned with the well-being of poor
agents. This was traditionally ensured by using focus, an axiom requiring the
income of non-poor agents to be irrelevant for poverty measurement. However,
when relative income matters, their incomes can no longer be discarded, as
they affect mean income. Weak Focus imposes therefore that the distribution
of income among non-poor agents is irrelevant, as long as it does not affect the
mean, our reference statistic.
Poverty axiom 1 (Weak Focus).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y , if n(y′) = n(y), q(y′) = q(y), y′i = yi for all i ≤ q(y) and
y = y′, then P (y) = P (y′).
The well-being ordering captures the trade-offs made by the social planner
between absolute and relative income. Domination among the Poor makes sure
the poverty index respects these trade-offs by imposing a monotonicity require-
ment in the space of well-being vectors, limited to poor agents.6 If the well-being
of one poor agent increases, while all other poor agents are deemed at least as
well-off, then the poverty index must decrease. This axiom implies Weak Focus .
Poverty axiom 2 (Domination among the Poor).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y such that n(y) = n(y′), if (y′i, y
′)  (yi, y) for all i ≤ q(y
′),
then P (y) ≥ P (y′).
If, in addition, there is j ≤ q(y) such that (y′j , y
′) ≻ (yj , y), then P (y) > P (y
′).
Subgroup consistency is a classical axiom which requires that, if poverty de-
creases in a subgroup while it remains constant in the rest of the distribution,
overall poverty must decrease. Sen (1992) has questioned the desirability of
such axiom by arguing that what happens in a subgroup may affect poverty
in another subgroup. Foster and Sen (1997) recommend not to use this axiom
when the index aims at capturing relative aspects of income poverty. I subscribe
to this point of view. The underlying issue becomes transparent once the chan-
nel through which one subgroup affects the other is modeled. This channel is
modeled here by the well-being ordering. If the ordering satisfies restriction R6,
relative income does not matter and subgroup consistency seems reasonable. If
6Domination among the Poor is familiar in essence with the axiom of Strong Pareto among
the Poor introduced in Decancq et al. (2012).
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relative income does matter, then it is not always meaningful to extrapolate
the judgments made on subgroups to the whole distribution. Weak Subgroup
Consistency restricts such extrapolations to cases for which a subgroup does not
influence the well-being of agents in the rest of the distribution. This happens
when the two subgroups have the same mean income. In such cases, poverty
judgments made on one subgroup are still valid for the total distribution.
Poverty axiom 3 (Weak Subgroup Consistency).
For all y1, y2, y3, y4 ∈ Y such that n(y1) = n(y3), n(y2) = n(y4), y1 = y2,
y3 = y4, if P (y1) > P (y3) and P (y2) = P (y4), then P (y1, y2) > P (y3, y4).
The next three axioms are classical auxiliary axioms. Symmetry states that
the identity of the agents does not matter. We can therefore work with sorted
distributions. Continuity requires the poverty index P to be continuous in
y. This is particularly important for empirical applications in order to avoid
measurement errors to have excessive impacts. Replication Invariance allows to
compare poverty in distributions of different sizes. If a distribution is obtained
by replicating another several times, then their poverty are equal.
Poverty axiom 4 (Symmetry).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y , if y′ = y · πn(y)×n(y) for some permutation matrix πn(y)×n(y),
then P (y) = P (y′).
Poverty axiom 5 (Continuity).
For all y ∈ Y , P is continuous in y.
Poverty axiom 6 (Replication Invariance).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y , if n(y′) = kn(y) for some positive integer k and y′ =
(y, y, · · · , y), then P (y) = P (y′).
Those axioms allow to derive an extension of the additive separability result
of Foster and Shorrocks (1991). Its formal statement is simplified by the intro-
duction of the following definition. A numerical representation d is a continuous
function representing the well-being ordering on the set of bundles deamed worse
than the reference bundle (z1, z2).
Definition 1 (Numerical Representations d). The function d is called a nu-
merical representation of ∈ R, if and only if it is a continuous real-valued
functions d : X → [0, 1] such that
• (yi, y)  (y
′
i, y
′)⇔ d(yi, y) ≤ d(y
′
i, y
′) for all (yi, y), (y
′
i, y
′) ∈ Xp,
• d(yi, y) = 0 for all (yi, y) ∈ X\Xp.
A numerical representation differ from a utility representation of the well-
being ordering in two ways. First, it is constant for all well-being levels above
the poverty threshold. Second, for poor agents, its value decreases when well-
being increases. The value obtained by this function is in a sense the opposite
concept of utility, as it measures the distance to the threshold. This value
measures therefore the lack of income well-being. Equipped with this definition,
the characterization of an additively separable family of poverty indices which
takes both absolute and relative income into account is stated in the following
Theorem.
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Theorem 1 (Family of additive poverty indices). P : Y → R is an income
poverty index satisfying Domination among the Poor, Weak Subgroup Consis-
tency, Symmetry, Continuity and Replication Invariance, if and only if there
exist a numerical representation d of the underlying well-being ordering ∈ R
and a continuous and strictly increasing function F : R → R such that for all
y ∈ Y :
P (y) = F
(
1
n(y)
n(y)∑
i=1
d(yi, y)
)
. (1)
Proof. The proof is lengthy and rather technical and is therefore relegated in
the Appendix. Basically, it shows that the result on additive separability of
Gorman (1968) can be applied here. The crucial step for this is to show that our
poverty index satisfies a separability property. After having applied Theorem 1
in Gorman (1968), the remaining part of the proof is an adaptation of Foster
and Shorrocks (1991). 
I will refer to poverty indices satisfying those five axioms as additive poverty
indices. An additive poverty index is thus - an increasing function of - the aver-
age lack of well-being in the distribution. Two remarks can be made about this
Theorem. To start with, this Theorem applies for a set of well-being ordering
larger than R. Restriction R1, stating that relative income is not a bad for the
poor, is not necessary for it. Then, not all members of this family are compelling
income poverty indices. So far, no restriction is imposed on the numerical repre-
sentation which, together with the well-being ordering, completely characterize
a poverty ordering over Y . Such restrictions will emerge from the imposition
of other compelling properties of poverty indices, such as Weak Transfer . Most
poverty indices derived after Sen (1976) satisfy this axiom. It encapsulates the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle which requires in this context that poverty does
not to increase after a progressive transfer is made between two poor agents.
This axiom is still compelling in this context since only the well-being of the
two concerned agents is impacted, as the balanced transfer does not affect mean
income.
Poverty axiom 7 (Weak Transfer).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y , a > 0, if yj − a = y
′
j > y
′
k = yk + a, z(y) > yj and y
′
i = yi for
all i 6= j, k, then P (y) ≥ P (y′).
On top of it, in line with a view shared by specialists (see Atkinson and
Bourguignon (2001)) and non-specialists (see Corazzini et al. (2011)), some
precedence should be given to physical survival over social functionings.
4.2 Giving some precedence to absolute income
The specificity of the poverty indices derived in this paper is that they ac-
count for both absolute and relative income. Both dimensions of well-being are
traded-off at individual level via the well-being ordering. Domination among
the Poor makes sure poverty indices take this well-being ordering into account.
When several agents are affected by a change in the distribution, the index must
balance the absolute and relative gains and losses made by those agents. This
balance should not give excessive attention to relative impacts. Let us consider
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the following example. Imagine one poor agent receives an increment (i.e. an
income increase) not sufficient to lift her out of poverty, while the income of
all other agents remain constant. This improves her absolute income, but since
mean income increases, the relative income of other poor agents decreases. I
argue here that, when balancing the absolute gain versus the relative losses, the
poverty index should never record this as a poverty increase. The fundamental
reason for this is that no agent has less resources she can devote to her physical
survival while one has strictly more. The relative income of some might be
affected, but the higher the number of agents whose relative income is affected,
the lower is this impact. Indeed, more agents in the distributions means a lower
impact of the increment on mean income, the reference statistic. This minimal
limitation of the attention given to relative income is encapsulated in Mono-
tonicity in Income. In other words, destroying part of the income of some poor
agent can never unambiguously decrease poverty.
Poverty axiom 8 (Monotonicity in Income).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y , if z(y′) > y′i > yi and y
′
j = yj for all j 6= i, then P (y) ≥ P (y
′).
I have argued above that only additive poverty indices satisfying Mono-
tonicity in Income comply with the idea that some precedence should be given
to absolute over relative concerns. I derive next the constraints on numerical
representations imposed by this axiom.
4.2.1 Constraints on numerical representation
Presenting the constrains inherent to Monotonicity in Income requires the def-
inition of the degree of priority DPij(y) given by the poverty index to an agent
with income yi over another agent with income yj in the distribution y. This
concept captures the relative impact on the poverty index of giving an increase
in income to agent i instead of giving it to agent j.
Definition 2 (Degree of Priority of yi over yj in y). The degree of priority given
to yi over yj in the distribution y by an additive poverty index P is defined as:
7
DPij(y) =
∂d
∂yi
(yi, y)
∂d
∂yj
(yj , y)
From this definition, if DPij(y) = 2, as in the example of Figure 2, transfer-
ing an arbitrarly small ǫ from a non-poor agent to i increases her well-being by
two times the amount j’s well-being would increase if j was the one to receive
that transfer.
The poverty orderings over Y represented by additive poverty indices are com-
pletely characterized by a pair (, d). Such a pair is not a unique characteri-
zation, as another pair (, d′) such that d′ = a + bd with b > 0, i.e. a positive
7The function d is differentiable almost everywhere (d is continuous). The value of its
partial derivatives at the points (yi, y) where d is not differentiable is defined as:
∂d
∂yi
(yi, y) = lim
ǫ→0
ǫ>0
∂d
∂yi
(yi + ǫ, y) and
∂d
∂y
(yi, y) = lim
ǫ→0
ǫ>0
∂d
∂y
(yi, y + ǫ)
As usual, the partial derivative of a function f(x1, x2) in the direction x1 at point (a1, a2) is
written ∂f
∂x1
(a1, a2).
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yi + ǫ
y¯
z(y¯)
yi
b
b
b
b
s(yj , y)
s(yi, y)
d(yi, y¯) = 0.8
d(yj + ǫ, y¯) = 0.1
d(yi + ǫ, y¯) = 0.6
d(yj , y¯) = 0.2
yi
yj
yj + ǫ
y¯
d(z(y¯), y¯) = 0
Figure 2: Illustration of the notions of degree of priority DPij(y) and slope
s(yi, y). In this example, DPij(y) =
0.8−0.6
0.2−0.1 = 2.
linear transformation of d, characterizes the same poverty ordering. On top of
, the minimal information necessary to characterize the poverty ordering is
the function DPij yielding the degrees of priority.
Monotonicity in Income sets a lower and an upper bound on the values DPij(y)
can take. These bounds, illustrated in Figure 4.b, depend on the slopes of the
indifference curves of the concerned agents. These slopes are defined as follows:8
Definition 3 (Slope at (yi, y)). s(yi, y) = −
∂d
∂y (yi,y)
∂d
∂yi
(yi,y)
We are now equipped to state the central result of this paper.
Theorem 2 (Bounds on degree of priority). An additive poverty index satisfies
Monotonicity in Income:
1. (sufficient condition) if for all y ∈ Y , yi, yj < z(y), we have:
s(yj , y) ≤ DPij(y) ≤
1
s(yi, y)
(2)
2. (necessary condition) only if for all y ∈ Y such that z(y) ≤ y and all
yi, yj < z(y), inequality 2 holds.
Proof. Monotonicity in Income requires that for all y ∈ Y and yi ∈
[
0, z(y)
)
we have dP
dyi
(y) ≤ 0. By the additively separable form of P , we obtain by chain
derivation:
∂d
∂yi
(yi, y) +
n(y)∑
j=1
∂d
∂y
(yj, y)
∂y
∂yi
≤ 0 (3)
From the definition of the mean, we have ∂y
∂yi
= 1
n
. From the definition of
s(yj , y), we get
∂d
∂y
(yj , y) = −
∂d
∂yj
(yj , y)s(yj , y) for all (yj , y) ∈ X . Inequality 3
8If the iso-deprivation curve has a kink in (yi, y),
s(yi, y) = lim
ǫ→0
ǫ>0
s(yi, y + ǫ)
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becomes:
∂d
∂yi
(yi, y)−
1
n(y)
n(y)∑
j=1
∂d
∂yj
(yj , y)s(yj , y)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L4
≤ 0 (4)
In the rest of the proof, inequality 4 is shown to imply the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions linked to inequality 2. As DPij(y) =
1
DPji(y)
, inequality 2 is
equivalent to:
∂d
∂yi
(yi, y)−
∂d
∂yj
(yj , y)s(yj , y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L5
≤ 0 (5)
Necessity is proved by contradiction. Suppose inequality 5 does not hold
for some y ∈ Y with y = g, z(g) ≤ g, yi = a, yj = b with 0 ≤ a < b < z(g).
Therefore, at (a, g), (b, g) ∈ Xp, we have for some l > 0 that L5 = l. I prove
that for all ǫ > 0, there exists y′ ∈ Y with y′ = g such that l−L4 < ǫ and hence
there exists an y′ such that L4 > 0. Take y
′
1 = a, y
′
k = b for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1
and y′n = ng−
∑n−1
h=1 y
′
h. Notice y
′
n ≥ z(g) since g ≥ z(g). For this y
′, rembering
that ∂d
∂yi
(y′n, g) = 0, we have:
l − L4 = L5 − L4 = −
1
n
(
2
∂d
∂yi
(b, g)s(b, g)−
∂d
∂yi
(a, g)s(a, g)
)
.
Taking n sufficiently large, we can make l − L4 < ǫ, implying L4 > 0, which
violates inequality 4. The condition is therefore necessary.
Sufficiency follows from the fact that if there exists an y ∈ Y violating in-
equality 4, inequality 5 is violated as well for a particular value of yj. For all
y ∈ Y there exists b ∈
[
0, z(y)
)
such that, taking yj = b in L5, we have L4 < L5:
−
1
n(y)
n(y)∑
j=1
∂d
∂yj
(yj , y)s(yj , y) < −
∂d
∂yj
(b, y)s(b, y),
where the strict inequality comes from the presence of the non-poor agent n.
This b is the solution of the following problem:
b = argmax
yj
−
∂d
∂yj
(yj , y)s(yj , y).

In essence, the more important is relative income in the well-being ordering,
the narrower are the possibilities for the index to give more priority to some
well-being levels over others. The intuitions for this result and its implications
are discussed in the remaining part of this section, based on particular cases.
Before moving to an example, I should emphasize the following point. The
existence of a numerical representation satisfying Monotonicity in Income and
13
Weak Transfer is not garanteed for all well-being orderings inR.9 This potential
issue should not be seen as problematic as such numerical representations exists
for the most natural  ∈ R, in particular, for all those satisfying restriction R5,
as illustrated below.
4.2.2 Constraints on numerical representation: an example
Assume that the social planner chooses the well-being ordering in the linear
subdomain illustrated in Figure 1.b. This linear subdomain RLin ⊂ R is defined
fromR by two additional restrictions: (i) all ∈ RLin satisfy restrictionR5, (ii)
for all  ∈ RLin, the threshold function z must be linear: z(y) = z0+ s¯ y, with
z0 ≥ 0 and s¯ ∈ [0, 1). Clearly, all numerical representations of the deprivation
orderings satisfying R5 are function of a unique variable: yi
z(y) . Assume further
that the numerical representation d must belong to the quadratic family Dq
illustrated in Figure 3.a, i.e. for all yi
z(y) ∈ [0, 1]:
d(yi, y) =
(
1−
yi
z(y)
)
+ α
(( yi
z(y)
)2
−
yi
z(y)
)
with α ∈ [−1, 1]
This family has no particular ethical appeal but simplifies drastically the
exposition. The parameter α can be interpreted as an indicator of poverty
aversion, controlling for the priority granted to agents at the bottom of the
well-being distribution. If α = 0, the poverty index will attach equal priority
to all poor agents in the distribution, no matter their differences in well-being.
The poverty index gives extra attention to agents with lower well-being if α > 0
and to the poor agents whose income is closer to the income threshold z(y)
if α < 0. The poverty index implied by the numerical representation does
not satisfy Domination among the Poor when α /∈ [−1, 1]. The implications
of Monotonicity in Income for this example are formally stated in Corollary 1
and illustrated in Figure 3.b. The coefficient of poverty aversion is bounded
below and above and the mathematical expression of those bounds depends
monotonically on the slope of the indifference curves of the well-being ordering.
Corollary 1 (Bounds on poverty aversion - example). For all ∈ RLin, an
additive poverty index with d ∈ Dq satisfies Monotonicity in Income if and only
if:
(s¯− 1)
(1 + s¯)
≤ α ≤
4− s¯+ 4(1− s¯)
1
2
(s¯+ 8)
Proof. See Appendix. 
Granting a minimal precedence to absolute income generates hence a trade-
off between the importance given to relative income in the well-being ordering
and the poverty aversion implied by the numerical representation. The more
important is relative income for well-being, the steeper is the slope of the thresh-
old function, the narrower is the range of acceptable values of poverty aversion
and the lower the priority that can be given to agents with very low well-being.
Notice that if relative income does not matter for well-being (R6), then the pre-
vious result puts no additional constraints on the numerical representations. In
that case, Monotonicity in Income is implied by Domination among the Poor .
9I am grateful to Martin Ravallion for pointing out this issue.
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yi
z(y¯)
1
b
b
0 1
α > 0
α < 0
d
α
s¯−1
1+s¯
1
b
b
b
1
−1
1
3
4−s¯+4(1−s¯)1/2
s¯+8
s¯
(b)(a)
α
=
0
area inside bounds
Figure 3: (a) Numerical representations of the quadratic family for several values
of the poverty aversion parameter α. (b) The upper and lower bounds on the
poverty aversion parameter α evolve monotonically as a function of the slope s¯
of the threshold function.
The intuition for the bounds on poverty aversion is as follows: a positive incre-
ment to the income of a poor agent i will affect the relative income of another
poor agent j. If the slope of the indifference curves is flat, agent j’s well-being
is not affected, but the steeper the slope is, the larger the drop in j’s well-being.
The additive poverty index will balance the gain made by agent i with the loss
made by j. If the index give disproportionate attention to the well-being level of
j compared to that of agent i, it could conclude that poverty has increased. This
judgement would contradict the minimal precedence that the absolute compo-
nent of poverty should have over its relative component.
This example was only meant to give intuition on the trade-off introduced by
Monotonicity in Income. The next section studies the drastic implications of
this axiom for FGT indices, the family most used in empirical applications.
4.2.3 Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices
Assume that the well-being ordering chosen by the social planner satisfies re-
striction R5. Assume further that the threshold function is non-flat : there
exists g ≥ 0 with g ≥ z(g) such that s
(
z(g), g
)
> 0. This is typically the
case of well-being orderings violating restriction R6. Assume finally that the
social planner wishes to select a numerical representation d belonging to the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family DFGT proposed by Foster et al. (1984).
Definition 4 (FGT family of numerical representation). The numerical repre-
sentation d belongs to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family DFGT if and only if
for all yi
z(y) ∈ [0, 1]:
d(yi, y) =
(
1−
yi
z(y)
)α
with α ≥ 0
This family allows for a wide range of judgements by modifying the param-
eter α, the coefficient of poverty aversion. In particular, some among the most
popular poverty indices are members of this family. The Head-Count Ratio is
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dyi
z(g¯)0
α > 1
1
b
α
=
1
α < 1
b
DPα<11i
1
DPα=11i
DPα>11i
b
0
b
1
1
s(y1,g¯)
y1
z(g¯)
y1
z(g¯)
yi
z(g¯)
(a) (b)
DP1i
Area inside bounds
s(yi, g¯)
Figure 4: (a) Three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke numerical representations associ-
ated to different values of the coefficient of poverty aversion α. (b) Only when
α = 1 does the degree of priority always lie in the bounds imposed by Mono-
tonicity in Income.
obtained when taking α = 0 and the Poverty Gap Ratio for α = 1.10
Let us examinate the consequences of Theorem 2 for the coefficient α by means
of an example illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4.a shows three possible numer-
ical representations attached to different values of the coefficient α. For which
values of α does the additive poverty index respect Monotonicity in Income?
Answering this question can be done by checking the necessary and sufficient
conditions of Theorem 2 at mean income y = g where the threshold curve is
non-flat. The answer is illustrated in Figure 4.b. As soon as α > 1, the degree
of priority given to any poor income - say y1 in Figure 4 - over yi goes to infin-
ity when yi tends to z(g). This arises due to the exponential form of the FGT
numerical representations. Since by assumption s(y1, g) > 0, the upper-bound
on the degree of priority DP1i(y) is therefore violated, as shown by the dotted
curve. On the contrary, if α < 1, the degree of priority DP1i(y) goes to zero
when yi tends to z(g), for symmetric reason. As s
(
z(g), g
)
> 0, this violates the
lower-bound, as shown by the dashed curve. Finally, when α = 1, the degree of
priority is always equal to one. This value lies automatically inside the bounds
since the slopes of poor agent’s indifference curves belong to [0, 1] for all R ∈ R.
Therefore we have the following Corollary of Theorem 2:
Corollary 2 (Poverty Gap Ratio). The Poverty Gap Ratio is an additive
poverty index, obtained from FGT numerical representation with α = 1 and
defined as PGR(y) = 1
n(y)
∑q(y)
i=1
(
1− yi
z(y)
)
= q(y)
n(y)
(
1− 1
q(y)
∑q(y)
i=1
yi
z(y)
)
.
Let  be a well-being ordering satisfying R5 and equipped with a non-flat
threshold function. The only additive poverty index of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
family respecting Monotonicity in Income is the Poverty Gap Ratio.
Proof. The argument of the proof is given above. A formal proof valid for a
class of reference statistics is provided in section 5. 
10The Head-Count Ratio is defined as HCR(y) =
q(y)
n(y)
and Poverty Gap Ratio is defined
in corollary 2.
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In the particular family of FGT indices, the implications of Monotonicity in
Income are particularly sharp. There is a collapse of the acceptable values of
poverty aversion for non-flat threshold functions. As a result, the only member
of the FGT family which gives a minimal precedence to absolute income is the
Poverty Gap Ratio. Notice that the Poverty Gap Ratio also respects Weak
Transfer since its numerical representation is convex.
5 Extension to a class of reference statistics
I have assumed so far that the reference statistic for relative income was mean
income. I investigate in this section the robustness of the results when relative
income is defined as yi
f(y) , where f is a reference statistic on the distribution
belonging to a certain class.
5.1 Class Definition
The question addressed here is the following: What is the class of reference
statistics to which the results derived above can be extended? We will denote
this class of functions by F .
Definition 5 (Class of reference statistics). The class F is the set of continuous
and symmetric functions f : Rn+ → R respecting:
• Monotonicity: For all y ∈ Rn+, i ≤ n, we have
∂f
∂yi
(y) > 0,
• Separability: For all x, y ∈ Rn+, if f(x) = f(y), then f(x, y) = f(x),
• No upper-bound: For all y−i ∈ R
n−1
+ , a ≥ f(0, y−i), there exists yi ≥ 0
such that f(yi, y−i) ≥ a.
• Concavity: For all y−i ∈ R
n−1
+ , if 0 ≤ a < b, then f(a, y−i) + f(b, y−i) ≤
2f(a+b2 , y−i).
A typical example of a reference statistic in F is a social welfare function
f(y) = 1
n
∑
i u(yi), where u is a concave and unbounded utility function. Three
remarks must be made on this class of functions. First, concavity is not a
necessary restriction but it simplifies greatly the exposition. Second, the median
is not a member of F . Theorem 1 does not hold when median income is the
reference statistic because the median does not depend on the income of poor
agents. In practice, median income is widely used for defining relative poverty
lines. This is for example the case of the AROP income poverty measure used by
the European Commission.11 There are advantages in practice for using median
income. The median is more robust than the mean in random samples, as
established in Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1994). In Theory however, the median
has no superior appeal which justifies its use as reference statistic. In particular,
this statistic violates the monotonicity requirement, which seems compelling for
my purpose. Furthermore, as it has been shown by de Mesnard (2007), poverty
lines referring to the median lead to poverty measures that behave in a counter
11The At Risk Of Poverty index is the Head-Count Ratio where the threshold function is
defined as 60 % of median income.
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intuituive way for income distributions experiencing an increase in inequality.
An illustration is provided by Easton (2002) who comments on the decrease of
the Head-Count Ratio in New-Zealand beteen 1981 and 1992. According to him,
the implementation of policies inducing regressive transfers led to a decrease in
the income of the bottom 80 % of households. Nevertheless, the median based
Head-Count Ratio dropped due to the significant decline in median income.
Third, the no upper-bound requirement is strong and not uncontroversial. In
this paper, this requirement has been used in order to obtain additively separable
poverty indices. Do the results carry over to statistics violating this condition?
In essence, the answer is yes, but it comes at the cost of a reduction of the
set Y f of income distributions the poverty indices can rank. Typically, the
reduced set Y f
′
will contain all income vectors with a minimal share of non-
poor agents. I illustrate this point using an example. Let Y f
′
be the subset
of income distributions with at least a percentage π of non-poor agents, such
that Y f
′
= {y ∈ Rn+|
n−q
n
≥ π}. Let the reference statistic be f(y) = 1
n
∑
i u(yi)
where u(yi) is a strictly increasing function infinitely close to u
′(yi) = min(yi, t),
with t > 0 defining the income threshold above which an agent becomes so rich
that further increases in her income do not affect the reference statistic anymore.
If π > 1
t
, then the results still hold in essence: Theorem 1 holds, the bounds
derived for Theorem 2 are slightly less narrow, but the Poverty Gap Ratio is
still the only FGT index respecting Monotonicity in Income.
5.2 Extension of results
Once a reference statistic in F is selected, the notations, restrictions and axioms
must be adapted accordingly. Write I = f(Y f ) the set of values that the
reference statistic f can take, where I ⊆ R is a real interval. For all a > 0,
let fa = f(a, · · · , a) be the value of the reference statistic for an equal income
vector in which all agents earn a. The social planner picks a well-being ordering
 on the set of bundles Xf =
{(
yi, f(y)
)
∈ R+ × I
}
. Let the reference bundle
defining the poverty threshold be (zf1 , z
f
2 ). The domain R
f of  is again defined
by the corresponding restrictions, obtained by replacing mean income by the
reference statistic in their definition.12 Poverty axioms are adapted using the
same convention. The additive separability result becomes:
Theorem 3 (Family of additive poverty indices). P : Y f → R is an income
poverty index satisfying Domination among the Poor, Weak Subgroup Consis-
tency, Symmetry, Continuity and Replication Invariance, if and only if there
exist a numerical representation d of the underlying well-being ordering ∈ Rf
and a continuous and strictly increasing function F : R → R such that for all
y ∈ Y f :
P (y) = F
(
1
n(y)
n(y)∑
i=1
d
(
yi, f(y)
))
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix. 
12Restriction R2 becomes: For all
(
yi, f(y)
)
∈ X
f
p , a > 0, we have
(
yi + a, f(y + a1n)
)
(
yi, f(y)
)
and R3 becomes: For all
(
yi, f(y)
)
∈ Xf with fyi > f(y), there exists a > 0 such
that (a, fa) ≻
(
yi, f(y)
)
.
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Straightforward adaptation of the notions of degree of priority and slope
allows to derive the extended version of Theorem 2:
Theorem 4 (Bounds on degree of priority). An additive poverty index satisfies
Monotonicity in Income:
1. (sufficient condition) if for all y ∈ Y f , yi, yj < z
(
f(y)
)
, we have:
s
(
yj , f(y)
)
n
∂f
∂yi
(y) ≤ DPij(y) ≤
(
s
(
yi, f(y)
)
n
∂f
∂yj
(y)
)
−1
(7)
2. (necessary condition) only if for all y ∈ Y f such that f(y) = fg where
g > 0 and z(fg) < g, and all yi, yj < z
(
f(y)
)
, inequality 7 holds.
Proof. The difference between inequality 7 and inequality 2 is the factor n ∂f
∂yi
(y),
which equals 1 when f is the mean. The sufficient and necessary conditions are
proven using directly similar reasoning as in Theorem 2 and are hence omitted.

Theorem 4 shows the same trade-off appear between the importance of rel-
ative income and the range of acceptable values for poverty aversion. The im-
plications of this extended Theorem on the poverty indices in the FGT family
are as drastic as before: only the Poverty Gap Ratio satisfies Monotonicity in
Income.
Corollary 3 (Poverty Gap Ratio extended). Let  be a well-being ordering sat-
isfying R5 and equipped with a non-flat threshold function. The only additive
poverty index of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family respecting Monotonicity in
Income is the Poverty Gap Ratio.
Proof. When d ∈ DFGT , we have for all y ∈ Y f , yi, yj < z
(
f(y)
)
:
DPij(y) =
(
z
(
f(y)
)
− yi
z
(
f(y)
)
− yj
)α−1
. (8)
Let f(y) ≥ fg where g ≥ z
(
fg
)
and s
(
z
(
f(y)
)
, f(y)
)
> 0. By restriction R3,
such g always exists and such f(y) with strictly positive slope also exists since
the threshold function is non-flat. Three cases can arise:
• Case 1: α < 1. Take any yi with 0 < yi < z
(
f(y)
)
. From equation 8, for all
ǫ > 0 there exists yj < z
(
f(y)
)
such that DPij(y) < ǫ. From the necessary
condition of Theorem 4, the lower bound on DPij(y) is s
(
yj, f(y)
)
n ∂f
∂yi
(y).
This lower bound takes a strictly positive value. We have in effect that
n > 0, by monotonicity of f we have ∂f
∂yi
(y) > 0 and finally by construction
s
(
yj, f(y)
)
> 0. This value does not tend to zero when ǫ → 0 because
then yj → z
(
f(y)
)
and therefore s
(
yj , f(y)
)
→ s
(
z
(
f(y)
)
, f(y)
)
> 0.
• Case 2: α > 1. Take any yj with 0 < yj < z
(
f(y)
)
. From equation 8,
for all ǫ > 0 there exists yi < z
(
f(y)
)
such that DPij(y) < ǫ. The lower
bound on DPij(y) is violated for the same reason.
19
• Case 3: α = 1. This case defines the Poverty Gap Ratio. For all y ∈ Y f ,
yi, yj < z
(
f(y)
)
, we have DPij(y) = 1. From the sufficient condition of
Theorem 4, we must show that for all y ∈ Y f , yi, yj < z
(
f(y)
)
, we have
s
(
yj, f(y)
)
n ∂f
∂yi
(y) ≤ 1. If this holds, the upper-bound is automatically
respected.
Lemma 1. The well-being ordering  satisfies R2 (Translation Monotonicity)
only if for all f(y) ∈ I, yi ∈
[
0, z
(
f(y)
))
we have:
s
(
yi, f(y)
)
≤
(
n
∂f
∂y1
(y∗)
)
−1
(9)
where y∗ is such that y∗1 = 0 and f(y
∗) = f(y).
Proof. Suppose inequality 9 does not hold for some (a, bf ) ∈ X
f for which
s(a, bf ) =
(
n ∂f
∂y1
(y∗)
)
−1
+ c with c > 0. Translation monotonicity requires that
for all y ∈ Y and all i ≤ q(y) we have d
(
y′i, f(y
′)
)
− d
(
yi, f(y)
)
≤ 0 when y′ is
obtained from y by a uniform increment. When considering an infinitely small
increment, the previous requirement becomes
−
∂d
∂yi
(
yi, f(y)
)
≥
∂d
∂f
(
yi, f(y)
)( ∂f
∂y1
(y) + · · ·+
∂f
∂yn
(y)
)
,
1 ≥ s
(
yi, f(y)
)( ∂f
∂y1
(y) + · · ·+
∂f
∂yn
(y)
)
.
Let y be such that yj = 0 for all j ≤ n − 2, yn−1 = a and yn = l such that
f(y) = bf . Taking n sufficiently large, we have that l ≥ z(bf) and hence y ∈ Y
f .
For agent n− 1, the last inequality can then be rewritten as:
1 ≥
((
n
∂f
∂y1
(y∗)
)
−1
+ c
) n∑
j=1
∂f
∂yj
(y), (10)
1 ≥
∑n
j=1
∂f
∂yj
(y)(
n ∂f
∂y1
(y∗)
) + c n∑
j=1
∂f
∂yj
(y). (11)
When n increases, yn increases as well and by concavity of f ,
∂f
∂yn
(y) decreases.
As n → ∞, the first term of the right-hand side of inequality 11 tends to 1.
Since the second term is strictly positive and does not tend to zero, we have a
violation of Translation Monotonicity. 
There remains to show the sufficient condition in Theorem 4 is satisfied. Since
 satisfies R2 (Translation Monotonicity), by the previous Lemma, we have for
all f(y) ∈ I, yj ∈
[
0, z
(
f(y)
))
that
s
(
yj , f(y)
)
n
∂f
∂yi
(y) ≤
(
∂f
∂y1
(y∗)
)
−1
∂f
∂yi
(y) ≤ 1.
By the concavity of f , the sufficient condition for Monotonicity in Income is
always satisfied. The Poverty Gap Ratio satisfies hence this axiom. 
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This last result proves the existence of additive poverty indices satisfying
Monotonicity in Income for all reference statistic f ∈ F and all well-being
orderings in Rf satisfying R5. However, one should not deduce from the pre-
vious result that the Poverty Gap Ratio is the only additive index satisfying
Monotonicity in Income. Depending on the choice of the reference statistic and
well-being ordering, other additive poverty indices will respect that axiom. The
FGT family has a simple mathematical expression but there is no ethical reason
to stick to that particular family.
6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to derive income poverty measures from a world
perspective. There is a need to develop a measure of income poverty that can
be compared across time and space, between populations with different stan-
dards of living. The challenge associated to such measures is to combine the
absolute and relative aspects of income poverty in a transparent and meaning-
ful way. Taking these aspects separately, absolute poverty measures point to
growth promotion policies whereas purely relative measures point to redistribu-
tion policies. A sensible measure combining both aspects would then point to
a balanced mix of both kinds of policies, which is the middle position taken by
many governements in practice.
I have argued that a global measure based on two poverty lines raises difficult
aggregation issues. Furthermore, constructing a single poverty line combining
both aspects is only part of the solution. There remains to provide an appro-
priate index aggregating poverty in a population when the poverty line is not
absolute. This question has received little attention so far. My proposal is to
capture the trade-offs to be made between absolute and relative aspects at the
individual level, by introducing a well-being ordering. This ordering is a nor-
mative choice of the social planner that allows her to compare transparently the
income well-being of agents in different societies. A family of additive poverty
indices that respects the chosen ordering is axiomatically derived. The prece-
dence of absolute over relative apsects of income poverty was encapsulated into
the axiom ofMonotonicity in Income. This axiom is shown to have strong conse-
quences on the acceptable numerical representations of the well-being ordering.
Granting such minimal precedence to absolute income introduces a trade-off
between the importance of relative income in the well-being ordering and the
poverty aversion of the numerical representation. The larger is the well-being
decrease for a given increase of the reference statistic, the smaller is the priority
that the numerical representation can give to agents at the bottom of the income
distribution. This trade-off is particularly sharp for indices of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke family. As soon as relative income matters for income well-being,
only the Poverty Gap Ratio respects Monotonicity in Income. The popularity
of this family in applications makes therefore the Poverty Gap Ratio a natu-
ral index for global poverty. Measuring poverty from a world perspective can
therefore be done by combining this index with an appropriate global poverty
line, like the one proposed in Ravallion (2012) or in Atkinson and Bourguignon
(2001).
Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) discuss the implications of using a FGT index
in combination with a unique poverty line. They compute the marginal valua-
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tion of income for two agents with equal absolute income but living in societies
with different mean income, and therefore different income thresholds. They
observe that, when using the Poverty Gap Ratio, the impact on poverty of an
additional unit of income is larger in a society with lower mean. Nevertheless,
this conclusion can be reversed for higher poverty aversion. They raise then the
question why a marginal unit of income might be valuated more in societies with
higher mean income. Some poverty indices satisfying all the axioms presented
in this paper (but outside the FGT family) might draw this conclusion. The
reason would be that, having the same income, the agent in the society with
larger mean income has lower relative income. The agent in the richer society
has therefore a lower income well-being. If sufficient priority is granted to agents
with lower well-being, the marginal unit of income has more impact if given to
the agent living in the high income society.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: From an ordering on income vectors to an ordering on lack of income
well-being (LIWB) vectors.
Take any d representing .13 Let m : Y → ×n−1i=1 [0, 1]i be a mapping returning
the LIWB vector v corresponding to an income vector y: v = (v1, · · · , vn−1) =
m(y) with vi = d(yi, y) for all i ≤ n−1. The vector v has size n−1 because y ∈
Y , i.e. d(yn, y) = 0 and is hence omitted. Therefore m(y) ∈ Vd = ×
n−1
i=1 [0, 1]i.
The mapping m is continuous since d is continuous in both its arguments and
the mean is a continuous function of its arguments.
Domination among the Poor implies Indifference among the Poor :
Poverty axiom 9 (Indifference among the Poor). For all y, y′ ∈ Y such that
n(y) = n(y′) and q(y′) = q(y), if (y′i, y
′) ∼ (yi, y) for all i ≤ q(y), then P (y) =
P (y′).
As proven below, we have that m(Y ) = Vd, the image set of Y through the
mapping m is Vd. Therefore, Indifference among the Poor has the following
consequence: for all d representing , there exists an ordering Vd on Vd such
that for all y, y′ ∈ Y we have y  y′ ⇔ m(y) Vd m(y
′). The ordering on Vd
depends on the numerical representation d defining mapping m. By Continuity
and the continuity of the mapping m, the ordering Vd is continuous. Therefore
Vd can be represented by a continuous poverty index P
v : Vd → R. Without
loss of generality, we can take P v
(
m(y)
)
= P (y) for all y ∈ Y .
Step 2: The ordering Vd on LIWB vectors is additively separable.
We verify that the assumptions of Theorem 1 in Gorman (1968) are all met.
This allows us to derive the the following functional form for the index P v, for
a given n ∈ N:
P v(v) = F˜
( n−1∑
i=1
φ˜(vi)
)
(12)
where F˜ and φ˜ are strictly increasing functions. The assumptions required for
this Theorem are the following:
Step 2.1: There exists a complete and continuous ordering Vd on a product
space Vd = ×
n−1
i=1 [0, 1]i.
The properties of completeness and continuity of the ordering Vd follows from
the completeness of the ordering , the continuity of the mapping m and Con-
tinuity. There remains to show that m(Y ) = ×n−1i=1 [0, 1]i. This means both (i)
m(y) ∈ Vd for all y ∈ Y and (ii) for all v ∈ Vd there exists y ∈ Y such that
v = m(y). If (i) follows directly from the definition of the mapping m, (ii) must
be proven.
Take any v ∈ Vd. Let g > 0 be such that g ≥ z(g). Income g is therefore a level
13We can restrict ourselves to continuous numerical representations d without loss of gen-
erality.
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of income such that, if consumed by all agents in the distribution, all agents are
non-poor. Such g always exists as proven in the next Lemma.
Lemma 2. For all ∈ R, (z1, z2) ∈ X, there exists g > 0 such that g ≥ z(g).
Proof. Suppose there exists b > 0 such that b < z(b) and consider the bundle
(z(b), b). By R3, there exists g > 0 such that (g, g) ≻ (z(b), b). This means
g > z(g). 
We need to construct y such that v = m(y). The next Lemma shows it can
always be done.
Lemma 3. For all ∈ R, (z1, z2) ∈ X, g ≥ z(g), v ∈ Vd, there exists y ∈ Y
with y = g such that v = m(y).
Proof. The existence of such g as been shown in Lemma 2. Let y be such that,
for all i ≤ q, yi = ai defined implicitely by vi = d(ai, g). By R
4 and the
continuity of d, we have that ai ∈ [0, z(g)) for all i ≤ q. Let y
′ be such that
y′i = yi for all i ≤ q and y
′
j = g for all q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We have y
′ ≤ g.
By the properties of the mean, there exists l ≥ g such that, if yj = l for all
q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then we have y = g. As l ≥ g ≥ z(g), all agents j with
q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n are non-poor. 
Step 2.2: Each sector [0, 1]i of Vd has a countably dense subset, is arc-
connected and is strictly essential.
As all sectors are real intervals, they have a countably dense subset and are arc-
connected. Strict essentiality means that given any (v1, · · · , vi−1, vi+1, · · · , vn−1) ∈
×n−2j=1 [0, 1]j, not all elements of [0, 1]i are indifferent for the ordering Vd . This
follows from Domination among the Poor .
Step 2.3: Let N∗ = {1, · · · , n−1} be the set of sectors in Vd and A ⊆ N
∗ be any
subset of sectors, we have that each A is separable. Separability means that for
all (u,w), (v, w), (u, t), (v, t) ∈ Vd, we have P
v(u,w) ≥ P v(v, w) ⇔ P v(u, t) ≥
P v(v, t).
Step 2.3.1: Construct appropriate income vectors.
Construct y1, y2, y3, y4 ∈ Y such that m(y1) = (u,w), m(y2) = (v, w), m(y3) =
(u, t), m(y4) = (v, t) and y1 = y2 = y3 = y4 = g with g ≥ z(g). Such vectors
can be constructed as shown in Lemma 3.
Decompose in subgroups y1 = (y1A, y
1
B, y
1
n), such that subvectors y
1
A and y
1
B are
associated to the LIWB subvectors u and w respectively. Typically, y1A 6= y
1
B 6= g
but our next operations will aim at obtaining such equality.
Triplicate y1 and re-organize the subgroups to obtain at least one non-poor agent
per subgroup. Let y1
′
= (y1, y1, y1) = (y1A, y
1
A, y
1
A, y
1
B, y
1
B, y
1
B, y
1
n, y
1
n, y
1
n). This
triplication does not affect the mean: y1
′
= y1. Reorganize subgroups: y1
′
=
(y1A′ , y
1
B′ , y
1
n) with y
1
A′ = (y
1
A, y
1
A, y
1
A, y
1
n) and y
1
B′ = (y
1
B, y
1
B, y
1
B, y
1
n). Letting
u′ = (u, u, u) and w′ = (w,w,w), we have that m(y1
′
) = (u, u, u, 0, w, w,w, 0) =
(u′, 0, w′, 0).
Construct y1∗A′ such that m(y
1∗
A′) = u
′ with y1∗A′ = g and y
1∗
B′ such that m(y
1∗
B′) =
w′ with y1∗B′ = g. Those income vectors exist as proven in Lemma 3, as sub-
groups A′ and B′ hold each at least one non-poor agent. The income vector
y1∗ = (y1∗A′ , y
1∗
B′ , g) is such that m(y
1∗) = (u′, 0, w′, 0). This vector is such that
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y1∗ = g as its three subgroups have mean g.
Using the same procedure (decomposition, triplication, reorganisation), con-
struct y2
′
, y3
′
, y4
′
and y2∗, y3∗, y4∗ such that:
y1∗ = (y1∗A′ , y
1∗
B′ , g) with m(y
1∗) = (u′, 0, w′, 0) = (u, u, u, 0, w, w,w, 0),
y2∗ = (y2∗A′ , y
2∗
B′ , g) with m(y
2∗) = (v′, 0, w′, 0) = (v, v, v, 0, w, w,w, 0),
y3∗ = (y3∗A′ , y
3∗
B′ , g) with m(y
3∗) = (u′, 0, t′, 0) = (u, u, u, 0, t, t, t, 0),
y4∗ = (y4∗A′ , y
4∗
B′ , g) with m(y
4∗) = (v′, 0, t′, 0) = (v, v, v, 0, t, t, t, 0).
For all m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we have P (ym
′
) = P (ym) by Replication Invariance. As
(ym
′
i , g) ∼ (y
m∗
i , g) for all i ≤ q(y
m∗), we have P (ym∗) = P (ym
′
) by Indiffer-
ence among the Poor . Therefore, proving P (y1∗) ≥ P (y2∗) ⇔ P (y3∗) ≥ P (y4∗)
is equivalent to proving P v(u,w) ≥ P v(v, w) ⇔ P v(u, t) ≥ P v(v, t). For
notational simplicity, drop the symbols ∗ and ′ to name the new vectors and
subgroups as the old ones.
Step 2.3.2: Prove P (y1A, y
1
B, g) ≥ P (y
2
A, y
2
B, g) ⇔ P (y
3
A, y
3
B, g) ≥ P (y
4
A, y
4
B, g).
Our income vectors are constructed such that P (y1A) = P (y
3
A), P (y
2
A) = P (y
4
A),
P (y1B) = P (y
2
B) and P (y
3
B) = P (y
4
B) by Indifference among the Poor . By as-
sumption, we have P (y1) ≥ P (y2). As P (y1B) = P (y
2
B), by Weak Subgroup
Consistency, we have that P (y1A, g) ≥ P (y
2
A, g) (remember all our subgroups
have their mean equal to g). By Weak Subgroup Consistency again, this implies
P (y1A) ≥ P (y
2
A).
Then, P (y1A) ≥ P (y
2
A) together with P (y
1
A) = P (y
3
A) and P (y
2
A) = P (y
4
A) imply
P (y3A) ≥ P (y
4
A). Two cases can arise.
• Case 1: P (y3A) > P (y
4
A). As P (y
3
B) = P (y
4
B), we have P (y
3
B, g) = P (y
4
B, g)
by Indifference among the Poor . Together we obtain P (y3A, y
3
B, g) >
P (y4A, y
4
B, g), by Weak Subgroup Consistency.
• Case 2: P (y3A) = P (y
4
A). We can not have P (y
3
A, y
3
B, g) < P (y
4
A, y
4
B, g).
Otherwise, as P (y3A) = P (y
4
A), Weak Subgroup Consistency implies that
P (y3A, y
3
B, y
4
A, g) < P (y
4
A, y
4
B, y
3
A, g). Again, as P (y
3
B) = P (y
4
B), we obtain
P (y3A, y
3
B, y
4
A, y
4
B, g) < P (y
4
A, y
4
B, y
3
A, y
3
B, g). This is a contradiction as the
two vectors are identical.
We can therefore use Theorem 1 in Gorman (1968) and obtain, for all v ∈ Vd:
P v(v) = F˜
′
( n−1∑
i=1
φ˜i(vi)
)
where F˜ ′ and φ˜i are strictly increasing functions. Functions φ˜i might still de-
pend on the rank i of the considered agent. Nevertheless, since Vd is separable,
we must have φ˜i = φ˜ + f(i). Defining F˜ (x) = F˜
′
(x +
∑
f(i)), a translation of
F˜
′
, we can rewrite equation 12 with function φ˜ independent of the rank i.
Step 3: Adapt the procedure of Foster and Shorrocks (1991) to show func-
tions F˜ and φ˜ do not depend on the number of agents n.
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Theorem 1 in Gorman (1968) is valid for a fixed number of agents n. Therefore,
when n is allowed to vary, equation 12 must be written:
P v(v) = F˜n
( n−1∑
i=1
φ˜n(vi)
)
Step 3.1: Define transformations of F˜n and φ˜n for normalization purposes.
Let Fn and φn be the following transformations of F˜n and φ˜n:
φn(vi) = n[φ˜n(vi)− φ˜n(0)],
Fn(x) = F˜n[x+ (n− 1)φ˜n(0)].
This yields: P v(v) = Fn
(
1
n
∑n−1
i=1 φn(vi)
)
with φn(0) = 0. Since the last agent is
always non-poor, we have d(yn, y) = 0. Therefore, we obtain that for all n ≥ 2,
by slightly abusing notations (by introducing the zero deprivation of agent n at
the end of the vector v):
P v(v) = Fn
(
1
n
(
φn(0) +
n−1∑
i=1
φn(vi)
))
= Fn
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
φn(vi)
)
(13)
with Fn and φn continuous, strictly increasing and φn(0) = 0.
Step 3.2: Use Replication Invariance to prove functions Fn and φn do not
depend on n.
I do not reproduce here the full reasoning of Foster and Shorrocks (1991) that
can be easily adapted to our framework. I rather provide the intuition behind
it. Let x, y ∈ Y be such that x is a k-replication of y. Letting r = n(x) and
s = n(y), this means r = ks and x = (y, y, · · · , y) for some positive integer k.
Let u = m(x) and v = m(y), using the same abuse of notations as before. Write
F = Fs and φ = φs. By equation 13, we have:
P v(v) =F
(1
s
s∑
i=1
φ(vi)
)
= F
(1
s
(
φ(v1) + · · ·+ φ(vs)
))
,
P v(u) =Fr
(1
r
r∑
i=1
φr(ui)
)
= Fr
( 1
ks
(
kφr(v1) + · · ·+ kφr(vs)
))
=Fr
(1
s
(
φr(v1) + · · ·+ φr(vs)
))
By Replication Invariance, we have that P v(v) = P v(u) and therefore:
F
(1
s
s∑
i=1
φ(vi)
)
= Fr
(1
s
s∑
i=1
φr(vi)
)
This expression holds for all k-replications. The reader interested by the ex-
tension of this domain of validity to all y ∈ Y with n(y) = r will find the full
reasoning in Foster and Shorrocks (1991).
Even if r is not a multiple of s, the same expression can still be used, because
the same reasoning can be applied between r and the least common multiple
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between r and s. Use transformations d′ and G of functions φ and F in order
for the domain of image of d′ to be [0, 1]. Letting d′(yi, y) =
φ
(
d(yi,y)
)
φ(1) and
G(x) = F
(
xφ(1)
)
, we have for all y ∈ Y :
P (y) = G
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
d′(yi, y)
)
(14)
with G a continuous and strictly increasing function, d′ is a numerical represen-
tation of .
7.2 Proof of Corollary 1
When d ∈ Dq and ∈ RLin, we have s(yi, y) = s
yi
z(y) where s¯ ∈ [0, 1) and:
∂d
∂yi
(yi, y) = −
1
z(y)
(
1 + α
(
1− 2
yi
z(y)
))
.
Inequality 4 becomes:
1
n(y)
∑n(y)
j=1
(
1 + α
(
1− 2
yj
z(y)
)) yj
z(y) s¯(
1 + α
(
1− 2 yi
z(y)
)) ≤ 1 (15)
The following condition is necessary and sufficient for inequality 4 to hold for
all y ∈ Y . Take any y > 0, we must have that for all yi, yj ∈
[
0, z(y)
)
:
yj
z(y)
1 + α
(
1− 2
yj
z(y)
)
1 + α
(
1− 2 yi
z(y)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L16
≤
1
s¯
. (16)
Inequality 16 is nothing else than inequality 5 adapted for d ∈ Dq and ∈
RLin. The sufficiency of the condition is implied by the proof of Theorem 2.
The particularity of this case is that inequality 16 is necessary for all y > 0.
Suppose this condition does not hold for some y = c > 0 and yi = a, yj = b
with a, b ∈
[
0, z(c)
)
. Take any g > 0 with g ≥ z(g). Such g exists for all
∈ R and (z1, z2) ∈ X , as shown by Lemma 2 in the proof of Theorem 1.
For a′, b′ ∈ [0, z(g)) such that a
z(c) =
a′
z(g) and
b
z(c) =
b′
z(g) , inequality 16 is also
violated. In effect, inequality 16 depends only on the fraction of own income
over income threshold. This arises in this example because the slopes and the
degrees of priority only depend on these fractions. The condition associated to
inequality 16 is therefore also necessary.
Two cases can arise:
• Case 1: α < 0, more priority is attached to poor agents with higher well-
being. L16 is maximal for yi = 0 and
yj
z(y) → 1. Replacing those values
yields the lower bound on α.
• Case 2: α ≥ 0, more priority is attached to poor agents with lower well-
being. L16 is maximal for yi → 1 and
yi
z(y) =
(1+α)
4α , when
1
3 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Replacing those values yields the upper bound on α.
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7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Few modifications to the proof of Theorem 1 are necessary in order to extend its
validy for the class of reference statistics F . Therefore, I do not reproduce the
full proof but point to the necessary adaptations that go beyond the convention
of replacing y by f(y).
Step 1: The mapping mf : Y f → ×n−1i=1 [0, 1]i is still continuous as all refer-
ence statistic f(y) ∈ F must be continuous in y.
Step 2.1: The definition of income g whose existence is proved in Lemma 2
must be adapted. Let g > 0 be such that g ≥ z(fg). As shown in Lemma 2,
the existence of such g directly relies on restriction R3: for all
(
yi, f(y)
)
∈ Xf
with fyi > f(y), there exists a > 0 such that (a, fa) ≻
(
yi, f(y)
)
. Suppose
there exists b > 0 such that b < z(f b). Consider the bundle
(
z(f b), f b
)
. By
R3, there exists g > 0 such that (g, fg) ≻
(
z(f b), f b
)
. Intuitively, g is a level of
individual income which, if earned by all agents in the distribution, leaves all
agents non-poor. Lemma 3 must be rewritten for the class F :
Lemma 4. For all ∈ Rf , (zf1 , z
f
2 ) ∈ X
f , g ≥ z
(
f(g)
)
, v ∈ Vd, there exists
y ∈ Y f with f(y) = fg such that v = mf (y).
Proof. Let y be such that, for all i ≤ q, yi = ai defined implicitely by vi =
d
(
ai, f(g)
)
. By R4 and the continuity of d, we have that ai ∈
[
0, z(fg)
)
for
all i ≤ q. Let y′ be such that y′i = yi for all i ≤ q and y
′
j = g for all q + 1 ≤
j ≤ n. We have f(y′) ≤ fg. As all reference statistics f ∈ F satisfy continuity,
monotonicity and No-upper Bound, there exists l ≥ g such that, if yj = l for all
q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then we have f(y) = fg. As l ≥ g ≥ z
(
fg
)
, all agents j with
q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n are non-poor. 
Step 2.4.1: The triplication of income vectors leaves all agents unaffected
since all reference statistics f ∈ F satisfy separability and therefore we have
f(y) = f(y, y, y). For the same reason, as f(y1∗A′) = f(y
1∗
B′) = f(g), we have
f(y1∗A′ , y
1∗
B′ , g) = f
g.
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